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MINNESOTA STATE BOARD FOR COMMUNITY COLLEGES V.
KNIGHT: CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS OF STATE
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LABOR STATUTES
INTRODUCTION
In Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight,' the United
States Supreme Court decided an issue which required consideration of
first amendment, labor and administrative law principles. The Court
confronted the question of whether a state may validly require public
employers to meet with employee union representatives to the exclusion
of nonunion employees, not only to negotiate contract terms such as
wages, but also to discuss broad issues of policy, such as budgetary plan-
ning and selection of administrators. 2 The Court answered the question
in the affirmative, upholding a statute which strengthens and extends
the relationship between employer and employee union-a relationship
which Congress and some state governments have supported consist-
ently by legislation throughout much of this century. 3 At the same time,
the decision shed new light on a rule of administrative law first enunci-
ated in 1915, which held that an individual does not have a due process
right to a hearing before governmental authorities when those authori-
ties are making policy decisions. 4 The holding also reinforced the rule
that, in the context of nonpublic forums, government officials may "pick
and choose" the speakers to whom they will listen-a rule which has
evolved from the Court's first amendment decisions.
5
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
In 1971, the Minnesota legislature passed the Public Employees La-
bor Relations Act (PELRA), which requires public employers 6 to negoti-
ate with their employees, through the employees' collective bargaining
representatives, on "terms and conditions of employment."' 7 The stat-
ute also requires public employers to "meet and confer" with profes-
1. 104 S. Ct. 1058 (1984).
2. Id. at 1060.
3. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 423.215-.254 (West 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1797.61-.776 (West Supp. 1984). See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 4-6 (1976) (discussing federal labor laws).
4. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
5. 104 S. Ct. at 1068.
6. The employers covered by the statute include the state and its political subdivi-
sions, agencies and instrumentalities. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.63(4) (West Supp. 1984).
7. Id. §§ 179.61; 179.66(2). "Terms and conditions of employment" is defined as
hours, wages, fringe benefits except for retirement benefits, and personnel policies which
affect "working conditions." Id. § 179.63(18). Most state legislatures tended to adopt
wholesale the NLRA phrase "wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment" to de-
fine their scope of bargaining. Pisapia, W1hat's Negotiable in Public Education?, I GOV'T UNION
REV. 23, 25 (1980). Yet Minnesota did not. Minnesota has specifically enumerated a list of
mandatory bargaining subjects which reflects a determination to limit the scope of bar-
gaining. Id. However, Minnesota courts have stated there should be a "liberal" attitude
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sional employees on policy issues which are not terms and conditions of
employment.8 If employees have chosen a collective bargaining repre-
sentative, the statute requires that the employer meet and confer only
with that representative. 9
Since enactment of the statute, the Minnesota State Board for Com-
munity Colleges has negotiated successive employment contracts with
community college faculty members through the faculty's exclusive bar-
gaining representative, the Minnesota Community College Faculty Asso-
ciation (MCCFA).' 0 Pursuant to the statute, the State Board and
administrators of Minnesota's eighteen community colleges also have
met with MCCFA representatives in regularly scheduled sessions to
meet and confer on policy issues not covered by the bargaining agree-
ments." Administrators and MCCFA members participating in these
"meet and confer" sessions have discussed such issues as budgetary pol-
icy, curriculum selection, and the hiring of administrators. 12 Under the
statute's mandate, the MCCFA has had the exclusive right to choose
which faculty members will confer with administrators in the "meet and
confer" sessions. The MCCFA has chosen only union members to per-
form that task. 13 The Minnesota State Board considers the opinions ex-
pressed by the "meet and confer" committees to be the official view of
all faculty. '
4
In 1974, twenty nonunion faculty members challenged the statute
in federal district court claiming that, as applied to community colleges,
PELRA constitutes an invalid delegation of legislative authority and an
unconstitutional infringement on the speech and associational rights of
nonunion teachers as protected by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments.' 5 The district court upheld the statute's meet and negotiate pro-
visions, but struck down as a violation of the first amendment that part
of PELRA which permits only the MCCFA to choose faculty participants
for the "meet and confer" sessions.16 On February 21, 1984, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling and held that
PELRA's meet and confer provisions are constitutionally valid.
1 7
applied when construing "terms and conditions of employment." See City of Richfield v.
Local No. 1215, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 276 N.W.2d 42, 49 (Minn. 1979).
8. Id. § 179.66(3). Under the statute, teachers are designated as professional em-
ployees. MINN. STAr. ANN. § 179.63(10)(1c) (West Supp. 1984).
9. Id. § 179.66(7).
10. 104 S. Ct. at 1061.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1062.
13. Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 571 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.
Minn. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 104 S.
Ct. 1058 (1984).
14. 104 S. Ct. at 1062.
15. 104 S. Ct. at 1063; Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 571 F.
Supp. at 3, 5.
16. 571 F. Supp. at 12.
17. 104 S. Ct. at 1064.
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
A. Collective Bargaining
The creation of labor unions and collective bargaining agreements
has brought numerous constitutional challenges to the courts, including
challenges under the first and fourteenth amendments. Rules and regu-
lations adopted in public sector bargaining agreements must withstand
constitutional tests simply because the government is the employer.
18
To better understand the case law dealing with constitutional challenges
to labor union agreements and practices, it is necessary to consider the
history of collective bargaining in relation to the speech and associa-
tional rights which are protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments.
1. Public-Sector Bargaining
Collective bargaining is the process by which employees, through a
designated organizational representative, and employers meet to estab-
lish terms and conditions of employment. 19 Private sector collective
bargaining was given federal recognition with the passage of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA),20 which rendered illegal
employers' resistance to employees' attempts to unionize in the private
labor sector.2 1 In the public sector, employee unionization has in-
creased rapidly since 1960.22 Many observers believe the initial impetus
for public sector bargaining was provided by President Kennedy's Exec-
utive Order 10988 which encouraged federal government employees to
join unions and bargain collectively. 23 Since then, federal courts have
stated that public employees have a constitutionally protected right to
join labor unions, founded in the first amendment.
2 4
Public sector bargaining is now widespread among state, local and
federal governments. In fact, in some states, collective bargaining in the
public sector is more prevalent than bargaining in the private sector.
25
18. Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REV. 183, 247
(1980).
19. PORTRAIT OF A PROCESS--COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT XXV
(M. Gibbons, R. Helsby, J. Lefkowitz, B. Tener eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as PORTRAIT
OF A PROCESS]. The National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.), section 8(d) defines collec-
tive bargaining as "[Tihe performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and to confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment, or the nego-
tiation of an agreement . . . and the execution of a written contract . . . but such obliga-
tion does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) (emphasis added).
20. See C. GREGORY AND H. KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAW 224 (1979).
21. Id.
22. Gershenfeld, Public Employee Unionization-An Overview, in PORTRAIT OF A PROCESS,
supra note 19, at 7.
23. Troy, The Agenda of Public Sector Unions and Associations, 4 GOV'T UNION REVIEW 15
(1983).
24. See Norbeck v. Davenport Community School Dist., 545 F.2d 63, 67 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917 (1977); University of N.H. Chapter of the Am. Ass'n of
Univ. Professors v. Haselton, 397 F. Supp. 107, 108 (D.N.H. 1975).
25. Petro, Public-Sector Bargaining: An Assessment, 3 GOV'T UNION REV. 3 (1982).
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Twenty-seven states have passed public-sector collective bargaining leg-
islation applicable to public employees. Twelve other states have statu-
tory coverage for one or more of the categories of policemen, firemen,
teachers or transit workers and only eleven states have no state-man-
dated public sector bargaining statutes.
2 6
2. Collective Bargaining in Public Education
One of the most well-publicized developments in public-sector la-
bor relations has been the adoption of collective bargaining procedures
by teachers. Most of this country's public school teachers are employed
pursuant to a labor contract negotiated by their teachers' union.
27
There are three major national educational unions: the National Educa-
tion Association (NEA), the American Federation of Teachers
(AFT/AFL-CIO) and the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP).2 8 However, the key decision-makers in educational collective
bargaining are local union officers, state councils or officials of district
councils rather than national union officials. 2 9 Educational matters nor-
mally subject to bargaining are merit pay, length of school day and
school year, terms of dismissal, pay raises, 30 leaves, insurance and griev-
ance procedures.A' The scope of bargaining in public education is in
some respects narrower than that of the private sector because state ed-
ucation laws often preempt issues normally negotiated in collective bar-
gaining agreements.
3 2
On the college level, faculties historically have enjoyed the opportu-
nity to participate in the decision-making processes of their institutions.
Such participation is accomplished by means of faculty senates or coun-
cils that consist of elected representatives. 3 3 In recent years, faculties
have begun to perceive that their role in governing their institutions has
declined or has become non-existent; thus, there has been a strong
move toward collective bargaining in higher education.3 4 As of 1981,
26. See id. at 8-9. These figures reflect the 1983 enactments of public sector bargain-
ing statutes in Ohio and Illinois. 4 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (State Lab. Laws) 23:215 (Jan.
23, 1984) (Illinois' public employment labor relations act effective July 1, 1984); 4A LAB.
REL. REP. (BNA) (State Lab. Laws) 45:217 (Aug. 8, 1983) (Ohio's public employee labor
relations act effective April 1, 1984).
27. Lieberman, Educational Reform and Teacher Bargaining, 4 GOV'T UNION REV. 59
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Lieberman.
28. Stern, Unionism in the Public Sector, in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING 62-63 (B. Aaron,
J. Grodin, J. Stern eds. 1979).
29. Id. at 63.
30. Lieberman, supra note 27, at 59.
31. Doherty, Public Education, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 529 (G. Somers ed. 1980).
32. Id. at 525.
33. Zeller, Why Faculties Organize, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION-
THE DEVELOPING LAw 81 (J. Vladeck and S. Vladeck eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as COL-
LECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION]. These representatives advise college admin-
istration on issues such as curriculum instruction, admission requirements, and grading
policies. Id.
34. Osborne, The AAUP Collective Bargaining, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER
EDUCATION, supra note 33, at 154. It should be noted that some observers believe faculty
senates and councils cannot survive collective bargaining in higher education. See, e.g.,
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thirty-one states provided for collective bargaining by faculty in higher
education. 35 State bargaining statutes such as Minnesota's PELRA rec-
ognize the importance of input by faculty members into policy decisions.
PELRA thus encourages a policy of close cooperation between public
employers and teachers due to the teachers' knowledge, expertise and
education that can be helpful and necessary to the quality of public
services.
36
As far as constitutional freedoms are concerned, the Supreme Court
has ruled that public school teachers do not lose their first amendment
rights as a result of their public employment status.3 7 A selected survey
of first amendment Supreme Court cases aids in understanding the
Court's position in cases challenging the constitutionality of collective
bargaining agreements.
B. Freedom of Speech
The first amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment, 38 provides that "Con-
gress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech. . . or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment .... .9 It was not until the close of World War I that the
Supreme Court began to interpret and apply the first amendment.
40
But by 1940, the Court had attributed to the principles of free speech a
place of highest importance in the balancing of state and individual
interests.
4 I
Wollett, Self-Governance and Collective Bargaining for Higher Education Faculty: Can the Two Sur-
vive?, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 33, at 15.
35. Henkel & Wood, The Power of State Legislatures in Public University Collective Bargain-
ing, 2 GOV'T UNION REV. 18-20 (1981). This figure does not reflect change since the enact-
ment of Ohio and Illinois public sector bargaining statutes in 1983. See supra note 26.
36. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.73(1) (West Supp. 1984).
37. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
38. The Supreme Court on many occasions has held that the rights protected by the
first amendment are implicit in the fourteenth amendment and therefore apply to the
states as well as to the federal government. E.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 460 (1958); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
40. See, e.g., Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (reprinted in part in
GUNTHER, supra note 38, at 1119-24).
41. SeeJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTrrUtIONAL LAW 864-65 (2d ed. 1983)
(citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1939); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939);
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937)). See also United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). ChiefJustice Stone noted, "[tihere may be narrower scope
for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face
to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amend-
ments." 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
It should be noted that only certain categories of speech are protected by the first
amendment. The Court has held that, "it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of
the First Amendment was not intended to protect every (kind of) utterance." Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957). For example, obscenity, defamatory words, and
fighting words are not constitutionally protected. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(obscenity); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation); Chaplin-
sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words). J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J.
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1. Content-based Regulations
The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that in order to achieve
self-realization and effective self-government, citizens must be able
openly to discuss or debate any topic, regardless of its content.42 For
that reason, governments may not pass laws or regulations which pro-
hibit or regulate speech because of its content or viewpoint unless the
content restriction is narrowly drawn and is necessary to achieve a com-
pelling state interest. 43 For instance, the government may not ban the
distribution of literature which urges citizens to resist the draft and op-
pose a war, unless that literature will clearly cause insurrection. 44 On
the other hand, governments may pass "time, place and manner" regu-
lations, the purposes of which are not to suppress a viewpoint, but are
necessary for the public convenience. Such regulations must be reason-
able, 4 5 must serve a valid governmental interest (but not necessarily a
compelling interest)46 and must leave open adequate alternative chan-
nels for communicating the information.
4 7
2. Public and Nonpublic Forums
In an early first amendment case, Hague v. CIO,48 the Court ruled
that the government is not only prohibited from regulating speech
based upon content, but in public forums it is prohibited from banning
speech altogether. 4 9 Regulations which curb constitutionally protected
speech in traditionally public places were held to be invalid, unless they
are narrowly drawn to provide for the public convenience. 50 The Court
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 943, 944, 954 (2d ed. 1983). The speech at issue in Knight
does not fall into any of these "unprotected" categories.
42. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917). See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CON-
STITUIONAL LAW 1106-10 (10th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as GUNTHERI (discussing free
speech values and judicial responsibility).
43. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-49 (1983);
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980). GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 1197.
44. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.) rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir.
1917).
45. See generally Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949) (a content-neutral local ordi-
nance against emission of loud noises on public street is reasonable); Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (a local ordinance forbidding street parades without a
license is reasonable).
46. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
47. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980). In Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981), the Court held that the state could require ISKCON,
a religious organization desiring to distribute literature and solicit donations at a state fair,
to do so only at an assigned booth on the fairgrounds. Id. at 656. The Court determined
that the regulation was not content-based; served a substantial government interest be-
cause of the state's need to maintain orderly crowd movement; and allowed alternative
forums for the expression of ISKCON's protected speech outside the fairgrounds. Id. at
654-55.
48. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
49. Id. at 515-16.
50. Id.
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later held that this rule applies not only to traditionally public places,
but also "where the state has opened a forum for direct citizen involve-
ment," such as school board meetings. 5 1 In the more recent case of Perry
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,5 2 the Court again
reiterated the rule that governmental authorities must show a valid and
compelling state interest in order to prohibit or regulate speech on the
basis of content in any public forum, whether that forum has been made
public by tradition or by "government fiat."15 3 Once the forum has been
made public, all speakers must have equal access to it.
5 4
However, in the last two decades, the Court has held that not all
publicly-owned places are public forums. 55 In Adderley v. Florida,56 the
Court ruled that the state of Florida did not violate the free speech
rights of student protesters in arresting members of the group for dem-
onstrating on the grounds of a county jailhouse. The Court reasoned
that the jailhouse and its grounds were reserved exclusively for "jail
uses," and thus did not constitute a public forum. Since the property
was not a public forum, the state could bar public access to it. 5 7 In Perry
Education Association, the Court concluded that in a nonpublic forum, the
state need only show that its speech-inhibiting regulation "rationally
furthers a legitimate state purpose."' 58 The Court ruled that the state
may choose among speakers in deciding who, if anyone, may use a gov-
ernment-owned nonpublic forum to air their views, as long as the choice
of speakers is related to the forum's purpose and to a valid state inter-
est.59 Perry Education Association was brought by a teacher's union which
had lost to a rival union in its bid to become the exclusive bargaining
representative for teachers district-wide. Plaintiff charged that the
school district had violated its members' first amendment rights by
agreeing to permit only the exclusive bargaining representative to com-
municate with teachers through school mailboxes.6 0 The Court rea-
soned that the bargaining representative's responsibility to
communicate with district teachers and the district's interest in support-
ing that responsibility, constituted a legitimate state interest to which
51. City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976). See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
52. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
53. Id. at 45. See also Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (regulation on
picketing unconstitutional because it was content-based and did not further substantial
governmental interest); Consolidated Edison, inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
540 (1980) (prohibition on public utility bill inserts unconstitutional because it was con-
tent-based and did not serve a compelling state interest).
54. See City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 168.
55. "The Court has stated on several occasions that the first amendment does not
guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the state." Com-
ment, Constitutional Law: First Amendment Restrictions Upon Nonpublic Forum Need Only Be Rea-
sonable and Without Discriminatory Intent, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 185, 189 n.41 (1983).
56. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
57. Id. at 47-48.
58. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 54.
59. Id. at 48-52.
60. Id. at 40-41.
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the exclusive access to mailboxes was rationally related. 6 1 Thus, the
Court has made clear that the strict scrutiny it has long used in review-
ing regulations which inhibit protected speech will not be used in re-
viewing cases involving a nonpublic forum. Instead, the Court will
uphold any government regulation in a nonpublic forum which results
in restricting communication, as long as the regulation is reasonable.
62
C. Associational Rights and Labor Unions
The first amendment protects both the individual's freedom to
speak and the individual's freedom to associate with others. 6 3 Included
in the latter constitutional protection is the right to associate with co-
employees in labor organizing efforts. For example, in Thomas v. Col-
lins,64 the Court struck down a Texas statute which required labor or-
ganizers to register with the state before making pro-union speeches.
The Court held that only if the labor activity presented a "clear and
present danger" to the welfare of the state could the state interfere with
organizing efforts. Unwarranted interference constituted a violation of
the organizer's speech and associational rights.6 5 The Court has also
ruled that individuals have a constitutional right not to speak or associ-
ate. These rights, referred to as "negative first amendment rights,"
'6 6
prohibit governments from compelling individuals to engage in speech
or to associate with anyone or with any idea. 67 In West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette,68 teachers and students were required to
salute the flag and several Jehovah's Witness students refused to do so
on religious grounds. 69 The mandatory salutation to the flag was found
to be unconstitutional because it compelled citizens to express their
faith in politics, nationalism or religion.
70
The question of whether employees have a constitutional right not
to associate with labor unions was presented three decades later in Abood
v. Detroit Board of Education.7 1 In that decision, the Court upheld a Michi-
61. Id. at 50-51.
62. Another example of the Court's recent decisions involving nonpublic forums is
that of United States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (resi-
dential mailboxes held not to be a public forum).
63. "Our decisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individ-
ual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977). See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
64. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
65. Id. at 530.
66. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and Associ-
ation, 23 B.C.L. REV. 995, 996 (1982).
67. Id. at 995.
68. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
69. Id. at 626, 629.
70. Id. at 642. Compare Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (aJehovah's Witness
allowed to cover state motto: "Live Free or Die" on his license plate because the statute
requiring display of this motto infringed on negative first amendment freedoms) with
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (negative first amendment
rights of shopping center owners not infringed by allowing visitors to engage in public
expression unrelated to the center's commercial purposes).
71. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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gan statute which allowed a public school teachers' union to require
nonunion teachers within the union's collective bargaining unit to pay
the union a service fee equal in amount to union dues. 7 2 The Court said
in Abood that fees extracted from nonunion teachers may be used only to
pay for expenses associated with collective bargaining and grievance
procedures; 73 such fees cannot be used against an employee's will to
support a union's political or ideological activities. 74 The Court found
that collection of dues for collective bargaining activities constituted an
"interference" with nonunion employees' associational rights, but rea-
soned that the interference was "justified" by the state's interest in labor
peace. 75 Labor peace in this context could only be secured by a union
assured of financial solvency through the collection of dues and fees
from members and nonmembers alike. 76 The collection of fees was fur-
ther justified by the fact that nonunion teachers benefitted from the
union's collective bargaining efforts. 77 The Court concluded however
that no state interest justified the collection of fees for ideological activi-
ties to which nonunion employees objected. 78 In this context, the bal-
ance between nonunion teachers' associational rights and the state
interest tipped in favor of the teachers. Thus, by the time the Court
turned to consider Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight in
1984, it had long recognized the validity of strong state support for em-
ployee unions, but had also established some constitutional protection
for nonunion employees who felt coerced by that state support.
D. The Right to a Government Hearing
The question whether an individual has a right to speak to and be
heard by governmental authorities was answered by the Supreme Court
in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization79 in 1915. The
Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 80
does not require governments to provide hearings unless they are mak-
ing decisions which involve specific, disputed facts which affect a small
number of persons on "individual grounds." 8 ' If the above circum-
stances are not present, the affected individual's recourse is not through
a hearing, but through the elective process. 8 2 The Court has not devi-
ated from this rule since it first was enunciated in Bi-Metallic Investment
Co., 83 even when the rule has been considered in light of the strong
72. Id. at 222-23.
73. Id. at 225-26.
74. Id. at 222.
75. Id. at 222-23.
76. Id. at 221-22.
77. Id. at 222.
78. Id. at 233-37.
79. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
80. The fourteenth amendment provides that states may not "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
81. 239 U.S. at 445-46.
82. Id. at 445.
83. See, e.g., O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 800 (1980)
(nursing home residents have no right to a hearing when government decides to close the
1985]
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protection of expression offered by the first amendment. 84
E. Academic Freedom
Until fairly recent times, the concept of academic freedom in Ameri-
can universities and colleges was grounded in tradition rather than in
law. Legal protection of academic freedom began in the 1930's through
the concept of tenure which was viewed as a way of protecting faculty
members' rights of free speech and association. 85 "Academic freedom"
as a distinct legal concept was not strongly tested until the McCarthy
era's "Red Menace" cases.8 6 In those cases, the Supreme Court stated
that academic freedom is a "special concern of the First Amendment."
87
Teachers in higher education were free "to inquire, to study and to eval-
uate" 8 8 due to their specialized role as the educators and leaders of
society.
On the secondary-school level, the Court has ruled that public
school teachers in unionized districts have the right to speak in public
forums on any issue-including bargaining issues. In City of Madison
Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Commission,8 9 a
nonunion teacher spoke to the Board of Education in a public meeting
concerning a topic of pending negotiation, namely, the payment of
union dues. The teacher's right to speak was upheld and the Court
stated that "teachers may not be compelled to relinquish the First
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment
on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of the
public schools in which they work." 90 However, the Court noted that
this case dealt with a meeting of the Board of Education that was open to
the public9 ' and that individuals may not always have a constitutional
right to voice their views whenever, however, and wherever they
please. 92 In fact, the Court recognized that meetings of official bodies
"may be closed to the public without implicating any constitutional
nursing home); United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973) (no right to
a hearing when governments set industry-wide rates for freightcar use); Bowles v. Willing-
ham, 321 U.S. 503, 519-20 (1944) (landlords have no right to a hearing when a govern-
ment agency imposes rent control); Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700,
708-09 (1923) (no hearing required when government determines whether an individual's
property is needed for public use); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.2 (2d ed.
1979).
84. "(T)he First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the gov-
ernment to listen, (or) to respond (to the individual affected by government policymak-
ing)." Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463,465 (1979).
85. H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW 163 (1979).
86. Id. See infra note 119.
87. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). Some commentators
believe that academic freedom is vanishing in the United States in the wake of compulsory
collective bargaining in education. See, e.g., Kirk, Bargaining Away Academic Freedom, 2 GOV'T
UNION REV. 20 (1980).
88. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
89. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
90. Id. at 175 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
91. Id. at 175.
92. Id. at 178 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48
(1966)).
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rights whatever." 93 This could conceivably include the implied constitu-
tional right (if there be any) of academic freedom.
F. Equal Protection
The fourteenth amendment guarantees all persons "equal protec-
tion" under the law.9 4 In interpreting this clause, the Supreme Court
consistently has held that states may treat individuals differently under
social and economic legislation as long as the difference in treatment is a
rational way of achieving a valid governmental objective. For instance,
in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 9 5 the Court held valid an Oklahoma stat-
ute which prohibited opticians from fitting lenses to the wearer's face
without a prescription written by an optometrist or opthalmologist, but
did not apply a similar prohibition to sellers of ready-to-wear eye-
glasses.9 6 However, the Court has held that when governments treat
individuals differently on the basis of race or violate an individual's fun-
damental right to interstate travel, to vote, or to appeal from criminal
convictions, the statute will be subject to strict scrutiny and will be up-
held only if the government can show a compelling state interest requir-
ing such legislation.9 7 Thus, in Brown v. Board of Education,9 8 Kansas,
South Carolina, Virginia and Delaware denied black students admission
to public schools under state laws that required or allowed segregation
according to race. The court found race to be a suspect class, applied
strict scrutiny to the state laws and found them to be unconstitutional as
a denial of equal protection of the laws.
99
Under these precedents, because PELRA involves neither a suspect
class nor a fundamental right protected by the equal protection clause,
the legislation challenged in Knight would violate the equal protection
clause only if it were irrational or if Minnesota's objective in fashioning
the legislation were to constitute an invalid state end.
93. Id. at 178 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
684 (1972)).
94. The fourteenth amendment states in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
95. 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (also decided on due process grounds).
96. Id. See also Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
97. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963) (criminal appeals); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (race). See
generatty GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 671-72 (discussing the "two-tier approach" of the
Warren Court that triggered strict scrutiny in the area of equal protection, i.e. the pres-
ence of a suspect classification and an impact on fundamental rights).
98. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
99. Id. at 488-95.
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III. MiNNEsoTA STATE BOARD FOR COMMfUNITY COLLEGES V. KNIGHT
A. The Majority Opinion
1. Interpretation of the Statute
Section 179.66(7) of PELRA permits discussion of policy issues be-
tween any professional employee and his or her employer "when such
communication is a part of the employee's work assignment." 0 0 Sec-
tion 179.65(1) of the statute permits any employee to discuss with ad-
ministrators "view(s). . .or opinion(s) on any matter related to the
conditions or compensation of public employment or their better-
ment ... "101 The Court interpreted these provisions to permit com-
munication between nonunion faculty members and administrators on
all issues of policy-even those outside the scope of the employee's
work assignments-as long as such communication does not take place
in, or take the place of, "meet and confer" sessions.10 2 Apparently, the
Court viewed § 179.66(7) as offering only one example of the contexts
in which such communication could take place (i.e., by way of employee
work assignments), rather than as limiting such communication to the
context of work assignments alone.'
0 3
2. Public Forums and Government Hearings
The Court ruled that PELRA does not violate the nonunion mem-
bers' first and fourteenth amendment rights because they have no con-
stitutionally guaranteed right to speak in the particular context
prescribed by the statute.' 0 4 First, the Court made clear that the nonun-
ion members had not been banned from a public forum, because "meet
and confer" sessions are not open to the public either by tradition or by
"government designation," and therefore do not constitute a public fo-
rum.' 0 5 For that reason, the Court concluded, the case was distinguish-
able from City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment
Relations Commission, 10 6 in which the Court ruled that public school
teachers had a constitutional right to speak at school board meetings.
Unlike public school board meetings, PELRA's "meet and confer" ses-
sions were never intended to be open to the public for public
participation.1
0 7
However, rather than conclude that the nonunion members validly
could be excluded from "meet and confer" sessions because such ses-
sions were nonpublic forums, the Court distinguished Knight from non-
public forum cases decided thus far. Nonpublic forum cases such as
100. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.66(7) (West Supp. 1984).
101. Id. § 179.65(1).
102. 104 S. Ct. 1058, 1061-62 (1984).
103. See id.
104. 104 S. Ct. at 1064-70.
105. Id. at 1064.
106. 429 U.S. 167 (1976). See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
107. 104 S. Ct. at 1064.
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Perry Education Association 10 8 were brought by persons who demanded ac-
cess to government property in order to speak to private individuals, the
Court said. In contrast, the nonunion members in the instant case de-
manded access to a government forum in order to speak to public offi-
cials. 10 9 They did not demand only a right to speak, but a right to speak
and to be listened to in a specific forum by governmental authorities-a
right which does not exist under the rule of Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v.
State Board of Equalization, ' 10 the Court concluded. 1 1 '
Nor did the Court find the state's refusal to listen to the nonunion
members while agreeing to listen to union members unconstitutional;
the Court reasoned that our system of government recognizes the free-
dom of public officials to choose to whom they will listen.'1 2 The Court
contended that any other rule would deprive all public officials, includ-
ing the nation's President, of the right to pick their advisors.'
13
3. Public Employee Unions
The Court next analyzed the case in light of the nonunion mem-
bers' status as public employees and concluded that they did not have a
right to a hearing by governmental authorities merely because those au-
thorities were also their employers.' 14 By way of analogy, the Court
compared the case with Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local
13156. 115 In Smith, the Court upheld a public employer's refusal to con-
sider employee grievances when filed by the employee's union rather
than by the employee himself or herself." 6 The Court in Knight rea-
soned that Smith rested upon the principle that, when making policy de-
cisions, governments may choose which of its employees to listen to,
whether they speak as individuals or are represented by a group-a prin-
ciple which also supports Minnesota's decision to listen only to MCCFA
members in "meet and confer" sessions. 117
4. The First Amendment and Academe
The Court rejected the nonunion members' argument that the Con-
stitution guarantees the right of faculty members to confer with adminis-
trators on policy issues. The Court held that dialogue between faculty
and administration on a college or university level is a sound American
tradition, but not one which is protected by the Constitution." 8 Prior
Supreme Court cases which recognized the importance of first amend-
ment protection for teachers were distinguished as involving govern-
108. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
109. 104 S. Ct. at 1064-65.
110. 239 U.S. 441 (1915). See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
111. 104 S. Ct. at 1065-67.
112. Id. at 1066.
113. Id. at 1064, n.6.
114. Id. at 1067.
115. 441 U.S. 463 (1979).
116. Id.
117. 104 S. Ct. at 1067.
118. Id.
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mental suppression of communication between teachers and private
individuals, while the instant case involved suppression of communica-
tion between teachers and public officials, the Court reasoned.' 19
5. Equal Protection
The Court, citing Perry Education Association, dismissed the nonunion
members' claim that PELRA denied them equal protection. 120 The
Court reasoned that the equal protection clause did not prohibit a state
from permitting only union teachers to speak in a nonpublic forum, as
long as the practice is rationally related to a valid state end.' 2' Further,
it concluded that the state's interest in labor peace and efficient em-
ployee-employer relations is valid, and the "meet and confer" sessions
are a rational way of fulfilling that interest.
122
B. The Concurrence
Justice Marshall agreed with the outcome of the case, but disagreed
with the majority's blanket application of Bi-Metallic Investment Co., which
he asserted denied the nonunion members the right to be heard by col-
lege administrators in any context. 123 Justice Marshall argued that the
principles underlying Healy v. James 124 and other decisions involving in-
stitutions of higher education support a constitutional right to faculty-
administrator communication in some situations. The Court often had
recognized that a teacher's freedom to speak and associate could not be
abridged if students were to become well-educated individuals and ef-
fective citizens, he asserted. 12 5 Justice Marshall concluded, however,
that PELRA does not violate this freedom, for the statute permits com-
munication between faculty members and administrators outside the




Like Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan argued that faculty members
have a constitutional right to communicate with administrators-a right
119. Id. at 1067-68. The Court cited Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967), Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), and Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234 (1957). Each case involved teachers who refused to divulge their political party affilia-
tions to governmental authorities attempting to rout Communists.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
121. 104 S. Ct. at 1069.
122. Id. at 1069-70.
123. Id. at 1070.
124. 408 U.S. 169 (1972). In Healy, the Court stated that denying official recognition
to student college organizations without adequate justification abridges first amendment
rights. Id. at 181.
125. 104 S. Ct. at 1070-71 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 479 (1957)).
126. Id. at 1071. As the majority opinion noted, the State Board and college adminis-
trators "solicit opinions" in college-wide meetings, and college administrators maintain an
"open-door" policy which permits all faculty members to meet with administrators indi-
vidually to discuss any topic of interest to the teacher. Id. at 1062, n.3.
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based upon the first amendment's "special concern" for academic free-
dom. 12 7 However, Brennan disagreed with Marshall's conclusion that
such right is satisfied by the contact which PELRA permits between non-
union faculty members and college administrators,' 2 8 and reasoned that
the communication allowed by PELRA is too "sporadic and informal" to
be meaningful. 1
2 9
Justice Brennan also concluded that the statute violates nonunion
teachers' associational rights. 130 "Meet and confer" sessions played so
central a role in developing academic policy that teachers who "want to
remain full members of the academic community" must participate in
them. 13 1 Thus, since only MCCFA members could participate in "meet
and confer" sessions, teachers who took their jobs seriously must join
the MCCFA even if they have "personal or ideological objections" to
the union.' 3 2 Justice Brennan concluded that the statute forced an ideo-
logical association unwanted by the individual which, under the rule of
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, violates the individual's first amend-
ment right not to associate with others.'
3 3
2. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens' dissent 134 was based on his conclusion that both
PELRA and the majority's holding prohibit any communication between
nonunion faculty members and administrators on any policy issues ex-
cept those directly affecting the teachers' academic specialty. '3 5 Unlike
the Court majority, Justice Stevens interpreted § 179.65(1) of the statute
as permitting communication between nonunion faculty members and
administrators only on issues related to collective bargaining. 136 In his
view, these limitations prohibit even willing college administrators from
listening to nonunion faculty members who want to speak about most
policy issues. 13 7 He thus concluded that the issue in the nonunion
members' case was not whether public officials could refuse to grant a
hearing to individuals, but whether the state could prohibit individuals
from competing for the attention of public officials who might be willing
to listen to them. '3 8 Justice Stevens argued that governments could not
prohibit such competition because to do so prevented the existence of
an "open marketplace of ideas" which is guaranteed by the first amend-
127. Id. at 1072.
128. Id. at 1072, n.1.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1073.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1073-74. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
134. Justice Brennanjoined in all but Part III ofJustice Stevens' dissent. Justice Powell
joined in all but Part II.
135. 104 S. Ct. at 1075-76 and n.1 (interpreting MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.65(l),
179.66(7) (West Supp. 1984)).
136. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
137. 104 S. Ct. at 1081-82.
138. Id.
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ment.' 3 9 By prohibiting any communication between nonunion teach-
ers and administrators on most policy issues, PELRA prohibited those
teachers from competing for the attention of administrators, thus violat-
ing the first amendment's "open marketplace" principle.
Justice Stevens' dissent also disagreed with the majority's conclu-
sion that "meet and confer" sessions were not public forums, arguing
that the sessions were public because they were held in public places and
open to public view. 140 Applying the rule of Police Department of Chicago
V. Mosley, 141 Justice Stevens concluded that the sessions constituted pub-
lic forums rather than nonpublic forums, and Minnesota could not allow
participation by one speaker while prohibiting participation by an-
other. 142 The opinion further reasoned that even if the "meet and con-
fer" sessions constituted a nonpublic forum, the majority erred in
applying the rule of Perry Education Association143 to uphold PELRA's un-
even treatment of union and nonunion teachers. 14 4 The discriminatory
treatment upheld in Perry Education Association was justified by the heavy
responsibilities the exclusive bargaining representative carried in com-
municating with district teachers and upon the labor unrest that might
result if both the exclusive representative and the minority union had
access to teachers' mailboxes. 14 5 Justice Stevens averred that neither
justification existed in the context of "meet and confer" sessions.
14 6
Finally, this dissent concluded that PELRA violated the rule of
Abood, which prohibited states from dealing exclusively with a union ex-
cept in the context of collective bargaining. Any extension of exclusivity
beyond that context violated the associational rights of nonunion em-
ployees. 14 7 Since "meet and confer" sessions were not connected with
collective bargaining activity, exclusive participation by the MCCFA vio-
lated the rule of Abood.'
4 8
IV. ANALYSIS
In light of Minnesota's academic tradition of strong faculty involve-
ment in administrative policymaking, to many minds PELRA is a terribly
unattractive law. However, as the Court correctly concluded, it is not an
unconstitutional one. It is the province of the Minnesota legislature, not
139. Id. at 1074-75, 1086. See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes,J., dissenting) (ultimate good is obtained by "free trade in ideas" and the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market).
140. 104 S. Ct. at 1084.
141. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). In Mosley, the Court struck down an ordinance which permit-
ted only labor unions to picket near public school buildings during certain hours.
142. 104 S. Ct. at 1083-84.
143. See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
144. Id. at 1085.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1083.
148. Id.
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that of the Court, to modify or abandon PELRA's meet and confer pro-
visions if indeed the provisions should be modified or abandoned.
A. Interpretation of the Statute
The Court's holding that PELRA does not violate the free speech
rights of nonunion teachers is based upon the majority's conclusion that
PELRA permits nonunion teachers to discuss all policy issues with ad-
ministrators in a variety of settings outside "meet and confer" sessions,
and that Minnesota's community college administrators do in fact feel
free to engage in such discussions with nonunion teachers. 149
1. Section 179.65(1)
The Minnesota legislature made clear in § 179.65(1) that PELRA
was not to be construed "to limit, impair or affect the right of any public
employee or his representative to the expression or communication of a
view, grievance, complaint or opinion on any matter related to the con-
ditions or compensation of public employment" as long as the commu-
nication does not interfere with "the rights of the exclusive [collective
bargaining] representative."' 150 Justice Stevens, in his dissent, inter-
preted this section to allow communication between nonunion teachers
and administrators on collective bargaining issues only. 15 1 He interpreted
the phrase "conditions or compensation" used in § 179.65(1) to be the
equivalent of the phrase "terms and conditions of employment"-the
phrase used in PELRA to refer to collective bargaining issues. 15 2 How-
ever, a close reading of PELRA forces one to conclude, as the majority
correctly did, that if the Minnesota legislature had meant to limit
§ 179.65(1) to communications involving only collective bargaining is-
sues, it would have used the phrase "terms and conditions" in place of
the phrase "conditions and compensation" in that section. Throughout
PELRA, the legislature consistently referred to collective bargaining is-
sues as "terms and conditions" of employment.' 5 3 In fact, nowhere in
the statute are collective bargaining issues referred to in any way but as
"terms and conditions" of employment. Thus, if the language of
§ 179.65(1) is to be viewed as consistent with the language employed in
the rest of PELRA, it must be concluded that "conditions and compen-
sation" refers to something other than collective bargaining issues. It
must refer to all conditions of employment, whether they be hours and
fringe benefits to be discussed in collective bargaining sessions, or
broader policy issues which are the subjects of meet and confer sessions.
Even if § 179.65(1) is viewed as ambiguous, PELRA's self-stated
legislative purpose leads to the conclusion that § 179.65(1) encourages
discussion of both collective bargaining issues and broad policy issues.
149. 104 S. Ct. at 1062.
150. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.65(I) (West Supp. 1984).
151. 104 S. Ct. at 1075, n.1.
152. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.63(18) (West Supp. 1984).
153. See id. §§ 179.63(16); 179.63(18); 179.65(4); 179.66(2); 179.66(4).
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The statute recognizes, for instance, that "professional employees pos-
sess knowledge, experience and dedication which ... may assist public
employers in developing their policies."1 54 If § 179.65(1) were read to
prohibit discussion of broad policy issues (i.e., those not included in
"terms and conditions" of employment), that legislative purpose would
be frustrated.
Hence, since PELRA permits nonunion teachers and college admin-
istrators to discuss in other settings the kinds of broad policy issues dis-
cussed by MCCFA members in "meet and confer" sessions, the statute
does not inhibit the "marketplace of ideas" whichJustice Stevens argued
is assured by the first amendment.' 5 5 The marketplace exists on cam-
pus everywhere except within formal "meet and confer" and "meet and
negotiate" (i.e., collective bargaining) sessions. To insist that the mar-
ketplace must encompass even these formal sessions is to ignore the rule
of Bi-Metallic Investment Co. 156
2. Administrators' Interpretation of PELRA
The majority in Knight concluded not only that PELRA allows sig-
nificant communication between all faculty members and administra-
tors, but that administrators of Minnesota's community college system
have interpreted the statute to permit such communication.' 5 7 Justice
Stevens, in his dissent, argued that testimony at the trial court level
showed that administrators were afraid to communicate with nonunion
teachers for fear such communication would constitute a violation of
PELRA.' 58 However, the Court majority concluded that the trial record
showed that administrators' fears vanished after "an initial period of ad-
justment to PELRA."' 159 The district court's findings clearly showed
that most administrators had not been deterred from discussing policy
issues with nonunion teachers outside "meet and confer" sessions. 160
The majority's conclusion was buttressed by the district court's
finding that "[t]he plaintiffs have not demonstrated ... that any faculty
member's exercise of free speech has been impaired in practice by virtue
of this potential inhibition [on speech]."' 16 1  In fact, the evidence
showed that nonunion teachers had ample opportunity to express them-
selves on all policy issues, including those which were discussed by the
MCCFA at "meet and confer" sessions. The State Board for Commu-
nity Colleges met with teachers and other individuals for open discus-
sions before each of its on-campus Board meetings; college presidents
held "town meetings" on campus, attended faculty meetings and other-
154. Id. § 179.73.
155. See supra notes 134-139 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
157. 104 S. Ct. at 1062.
158. Id. at 1077.
159. Id. at 1062, n.4.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1062, n.4.
726 [Vol. 62:2
COMMUNITY COLLEGES v. KNIGHT
wise maintained an "open-door" policy. 16 2 One could assume that
since college presidents felt free to speak with all teachers, other admin-
istrators also communicated with all teachers. This being the case, it
could not be said that administrators had interpreted PELRA in a way
which had hampered that "marketplace of ideas" essential to free
speech.
3. Amplification of Union Voices
The Court did acknowledge the district court's finding that the
MCCFA's voice was amplified over that of nonunion teachers by virtue
of PELRA's "meet and confer" sessions. The sessions produced what
administrators perceived to be the official view of the faculty on policy
issues. 16 3 But the Court rightly concluded that Smith v. Arkansas State
Highway Employees, Local 1315 clearly held that such amplification does
not violate free speech rights. 16 4 "Amplification of the sort claimed is
inherent in government's freedom to choose advisors," the majority
noted. 16 5 That is, choosing to listen to just one of many speakers is the
equivalent of choosing to amplify the voice of that speaker, and to de-
emphasize the voices of others.
B. Public v. Nonpublic Forums
The Court's holding that "meet and confer" sessions were not pub-
lic forums rested squarely on a line of precedent beginning with Adderley
and continuing through Perry Education Association. 16 6 "Meet and confer"
sessions, like the jailhouse grounds in Adderley, were not traditionally
public places. Nor had they been opened by government for public par-
ticipation. Therefore, under the rule of Adderley, government officials
could ban individuals from "meet and confer" sessions. Perry Education
Association, moreover, held that government officials could admit some
individuals and ban others who want to speak in such nonpublic forums,
as long as the government did not base its choice of speakers on the
speaker's viewpoint, or the speech's content. 16 7 Officials may base the
choice of speaker on the speaker's status 168 (e.g., union members v. non-
union employees), 16 9 subject matter or category of speech' 70 (e.g., com-
mercial v. noncommercial speech), 17 1 or speaker identity 17 2 (e.g., the
President may choose who will advise him as Chief of Staff). Thus, if
Minnesota chose to let some teachers speak at "meet and confer" ses-
162. Id. at 1062, n.3.
163. Id. at 1062, 1068; See Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 571
F. Supp. 1, 8 (D. Minn. 1982).
164. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
165. 104 S. Ct. at 1068.
166. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
167. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 at 46.
168. Id. at 49.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
172. 460 U.S. 37 at 50.
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sions because they are representatives of the MCCFA, the choice was
valid because it was based on the speakers' union status. If, on the other
hand, a state choose only to listen to those teachers who favor a curricu-
lum based upon a certain political outlook, that choice would be invalid,
for it would be based upon those speakers' viewpoints. As Perry Educa-
tion Association held, a choice based upon speaker status is valid as long as
it rationally promotes a valid state end. 17 3 It is not correct to say, as
Justice Stevens does, 174 that once a government opens a forum to one
speaker, it must allow communication from all other speakers unless the
state has a compelling reason for not doing so. Minnesota's choosing to
permit only MCCFA teachers to speak at "meet and confer" sessions is a
rational way of achieving two valid state ends: maintaining a peaceful
relationship with public employees and better serving college communi-
ties by receiving guidance from professional teachers.
The Court distinguished the instant case from nonpublic forum
cases because the nonunion members in the instant case demanded to
speak to public officials rather than to private individuals.17 5 The Court
reasoned that analysis of nonpublic forum cases was therefore "irrele-
vant," since individuals can never demand a government audience when
a government is making a policy decision.17 6 Such reasoning, however,
goes too far in separating the rule governing "government hearings"
from that of public and nonpublic forums. Nonpublic forum analysis is
necessary in Knight because it answers the question whether government
officials may refuse to listen to one speaker while agreeing to listen to
another. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. and its progeny answer only the ques-
tion whether government officials acting in a policy-making capacity may
refuse to listen to all individuals. 17 7 Indeed, for this reason, the Court
in Knight found the nonpublic forum analysis of Perry Education Association
far from irrelevant in the Court's consideration of the nonunion teach-
ers' equal protection claim.1
78
C. Associational Rights
The nonunion teachers argued, and the dissenters agreed, that
PELRA violated their first amendment right to associate freely and to
refrain from associating with others. 17 9 They complained that they were
faced with the choice ofjoining the union or of being denied meaningful
communication with administrators, thereby losing their status as full
and effective members of the faculty. To be a full member of the faculty,
the dissenters reasoned, teachers were forced by PELRA to join a union
even though those teachers were ideologically opposed to unionism.
173. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
174. See 104 S. Ct. at 1084.
175. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
176. 104 S. Ct. at 1065.
177. See Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
See also supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
178. See 104 S. Ct. at 1069.
179. See supra notes 130-33, 147-48 and accompanying text.
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Such coercion, they argued, clearly violated the rule of Abood. 180
The majority's rejection of this argument is implicit in its conclu-
sion that nonunion faculty members have ample opportunity to discuss
policy issues with administrators. Nonunion faculty members who feel
that they must communicate with administrators on issues of policy in
order to maintain their status as full and effective members of the faculty
have many opportunities to do so. They may communicate with mem-
bers of the State Board before on-campus Board meetings, with the col-
lege president at town meetings and at discussion breakfasts, through
letters and personal contact with the system's chancellor or by visiting
the offices of other administrators.181 Thus, in light of the many oppor-
tunities nonunion teachers have to communicate with administrators on
broad policy issues, teachers need not join the MCCFA (and participate
in "meet and confer" sessions) in order to communicate meaningfully
with administrators.
D. The Academic Setting
The Court did not err in finding that nonunion faculty members
have no special right to a government audience by virtue of the aca-
demic setting in which they work. The Court has never indicated that
teachers have a greater right than does the general public to speak in
nonpublic forums, or to speak before public officials. 18 2 In fact, in Picker-
ing v. Board of Education' 8 3 the Court stated in dicta that the state may
restrict the speech of public school teachers in situations in which gov-
ernment would not be free to restrict the speech of other citizens. Pub-
lic school teachers may speak out only if the communication does not
"impede the teacher's proper performance. . . in the classroom or...
[interfere] with regular operation of the schools generally."'18 4 The dis-
trict court argued, ad did Justice Brennan in Knight that the first amend-
ment nevertheless offered enhanced protection to university-level
professors. 18 5 The argument stemmed from dicta found in a series of
cases spawned during the McCarthy era, in which the Court struck down
state statutes which required teachers to take loyalty oaths or otherwise
prove they were not affiliated with the Communist Party. 18 6 To deny
employment in universities on the basis of political party affiliation
would deny university students (and, therefore, the country's future
leaders) "that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a
multitude of tongues .... . '.187 As the Court in Knight pointed out,
these McCarthy era cases were clearly distinguishable from the case
180. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
181. 104 S. Ct. at 1062, n.3.
182. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
183. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
184. Id. at 572-73.
185. 104 S. Ct. at 1072-73; Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 571
F. Supp. at 9.
186. See stipra note 119.
187. Keyishian %-.Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967) (quoting United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943)).
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before them. The former cases involved statutes which prohibited
teachers from speaking and associating with Communists in private fo-
rums. The statute at issue in Knight prohibited teachers from speaking
to public officials in the context of one nonpublic forum ("meet and
confer" sessions).' 8 8 In fact, the dicta of the former cases could not be
applied to Knight without overruling Bi-Metallic Investment Co., Smith v.
Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, and other Supreme Court
decisions which upheld government's freedom to ignore speakers alto-
gether, or to choose to which speakers to listen. In fact, commentators
have urged that the special first amendment protection which the court
has espoused in dicta has actually been applied not to teachers but
rather to colleges and universities as institutions.
18 9
E. Government Hearings
The Court's holding is soundly supported by Bi-Metallic Investment
Co. Justice Stevens' assertion that the state may not prevent public offi-
cials from listening to individuals if those officials are potentially willing
listeners' 9 0 ignores the fact that the public officials involved in Knight are
the state, for they are agents of the state whose power is prescribed by
the legislature. 19 1 His argument also pales in light of the many opportu-




The Court has ruled consistently that a state, in developing social
and economic legislation, may treat individuals differently as long as it
can show a rational basis for the legislation. Only when the legislation
or regulation affects a "suspect class" of persons or involves voting, in-
terstate travel or criminal appeals-which PELRA does not-will the
Court require more.' 9 3 As the Court noted, Minnesota's interest in
"ensuring that its public employers hear one . . . voice presenting the
majority view of its professional employees on employment-related pol-
icy questions" is rational. 194 It therefore passed the minimal scrutiny
the Court has always applied in reviewing such legislation.
CONCLUSION
Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight constituted a
synthesis of administrative, first amendment, and labor law and placed a
188. See supra notes 100-10 1 and accompanying text.
189. See Katz, The First Amendment's Protection of Expressive Activity in the University Class-
room: A Constitutional Myth, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 857, 859, 863 (1983); Malin & Ladenson,
University Faculty Members' Right to Dissent: Toward a Unified Theory of Contractual and Constitu-
tional Protection, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 933, 950-55 (1983).
190. See Bi-Metallic Investment Co., 239 U.S. at 445.
191. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8 (1976).
192. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
194. 104 S. Ct. at 1069.
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limit upon the otherwise broad protection of speech and associational
rights offered by the first amendment. As the Court interprets the Con-
stitution, individuals do not have a right to be heard by public officials
making policy decisions in a nonpublic forum, regardless of the individ-
uals' status. In fact, those officials may choose which speakers to listen
to and may base their choice on the speakers' union status, even when
the policies or rules involved do not concern collective bargaining
issues.
The holding in Knight, being based upon the strong precedent set in
Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, reflects a long-held
belief by the Court that government will grind to a halt unless officials
who make rules and set policy are free to seek advice from whomever
they please.' 9 5 In this context, the individual's first amendment protec-
tion must bow to the needs of government as a whole.
Diana L. Insolio
Jill B. Nelson
195. See Bi-Metali Investment Co., 239 U.S. at 445.
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